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INTRODUCTION

How secure are Americans’ electronic communications? The
government has the ability to “watch and listen to telephone, e-mail,
or Internet communication in almost any circumstance, and it can
power through massive amounts of electronic data in search of
relevant information almost instantaneously” with the development
in technology.1
The government has been encroaching on
Americans’ electronic communications in the name of national
security since the 1930s.2 Presidents have claimed that they have
inherent power to authorize warrantless electronic surveillance
because they have a duty to protect the United States against foreign
countries.3 National security is important, but so is the individual’s
privacy.4 Presidents have used surveillance to protect the nation5;
however, the use of electronic surveillance was not limited to
protecting the nation.6 Eventually, Congress had to step in to put an
end to abusive use of electronic surveillance.
The Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA or the Act) provided a
statutory procedure for the government to conduct electronic

* Kristen Choi is a third-year student at Pepperdine University School of Law.
She would like to thank the Lord for his guidance. She would also like to thank her
family for their endless love, support, and encouragement to pursue her dream.
And lastly, she would like to thank her best friend, James Lee, for always loving
her and supporting her through hard times.
1

William C. Banks, The Death of FISA, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1209, 1216 (2007).
Richard Henry Seamon & William Dylan Gardner, The Patriot Act and the
Wall Between Foreign Intelligence and Law Enforcement, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 319, 330 (2005).
3
Id.
4
“The Constitution envisions the protection of individuals from both foreign
threats and government intrusion and the foreign intelligence purpose requirement
epitomizes this conflict.” David Hardin, The Fuss Over Two Small Words: The
Unconstitutionality of The USA Patriot Act Amendments To FISA Under The
Fourth Amendment, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 291, 344 (2003).
5
John Yoo, The Terrorist Surveillance Program and the Constitution, 14 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 565, 588 (2007). “President Franklin Roosevelt authorized the FBI
to intercept any communications . . . of persons ‘suspected of subversive activities
against the [g]overnment . . . .’” Id.
6
See infra Part II for discussion of how Presidents in the past have abused the
surveillance.
2
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surveillance, limiting warrantless electronic surveillance.7 Since the
passage of FISA in 1978, Congress has passed several statutes
amending FISA.8 In 2008, Congress passed yet another amendment
to FISA, which permits the Attorney General and the Director of
National Intelligence to acquire foreign intelligence information for
up to one year, by jointly authorizing the surveillance of individuals
who are reasonably believed to be located outside the United States.9
Many scholars have debated over the constitutionality of changes to
FISA, and whether these changes are strengthening or weakening the
government’s ability to conduct electronic surveillance.10 Other
scholars have also challenged the constitutionality of changes to
FISA. In Clapper v. Amnesty International USA, a group of
attorneys and human rights, labor, legal, and media organizations
(collectively Respondents) challenged the constitutionality of the
FISA Amendments Act.11 In a 5–4 decision, the Supreme Court of
the United States ruled that Respondents—whose work requires them
to frequently engage in international communications with persons
not in the United States—lacked standing to challenge the
amendment to FISA.12
In Part II, this note will examine FISA and the amendments to the
Act in detail, the need for changes to the Act, and briefly provide an
overview of the Fourth Amendment issue.13 Part III will include
details of Clapper, including Respondents’ claim and why they
7
Stephanie Cooper Blum, What Really is at Stake with the FISA Amendments
Act of 2008 and Ideas for Future Surveillance Reform, 18 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 269,
275 (2009).
8
See id. at 280 (The U.S.A. Patriot Act amended several provisions of FISA.);
Robert N. Davis, Striking the Balance: National Security vs. Civil Liberties, 29
BROOK. J. INT’L L. 175, 204 (2003) (The 1994 Amendments to FISA added
procedures for physical searches.); Brenton Hund, Disappearing Safeguards: FISA
Nonresident Alien “Loophole” is Unconstitutional, 15 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP.
L. 169, 200–02 (2007) (The “Lone Wolf” Amendment expanded the definition of
agent of a foreign power, and the USA Patriot Improvement and Reauthorization
Act of 2005 extended the duration of surveillance.).
9
50 U.S.C. § 1881a(a) (2012).
10
See infra Part II for the discussion of different scholars’ thoughts on FISA
changes.
11
Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1142 (2013).
12
Id. at 1155.
13
See infra Part II.
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believed that they had standing.14 Part IV will examine lower court
decisions, specifically focusing on Article III standing.15 Part V will
examine how the U.S. Supreme Court came to its decision that
Respondents did not satisfy the imminent injury element and thus did
not have standing.16 This part will also examine Justice Breyer’s
dissent, how he criticizes the Court’s analysis of imminent injury,
and why he believes Respondents’ injury is not too speculative.17
Part VI will analyze the impact of the ruling in Clapper.18 Who has
standing to bring a claim against FISA? Is the ruling of the Court
strengthening FISA? This part will discuss opinions of scholars on
whether the amendments to FISA are obliterating its original purpose
to stop the government from abusing electronic surveillance in the
name of national security.19 Part VI will also discuss the impact of
these changes to the Act on the balance between national security and
individuals’ privacy.20 Part VII concludes that the purpose of FISA
(keeping the balance between national security and individuals’
privacy) has been frustrated by numerous amendments to FISA,
especially within the past decade.21
II.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

In 1978, Congress passed FISA as a response to the Court’s
decision in United States v. United States District Court, commonly
called Keith.22 In Keith, the United States charged three defendants
14

See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.
16
See infra Part V.A.
17
See infra Part V.B.
18
See infra Part VI.
19
See infra Part VI.
20
See infra Part VI.
21
See infra Part VII.
22
United States v. U.S. District Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 299 (1972). “The
title ‘Keith’ is taken from the name of then-United States District Court Judge
Damon Keith.” Tracey Maclin, The Bush Administration’s Terrorist Surveillance
Program and the Fourth Amendment’s Warrant Requirement: Lessons from Justice
Powell and the Keith Case, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV 1259, 1263 n.9 (2008). Judge
Keith disagreed with the Government’s claim that the President has the inherent
authority to authorize warrantless wiretaps for national security purposes and
ordered the Government to disclose electronic surveillance directed at the
15
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with conspiracy to destroy government property.23 During pretrial
proceedings, the defendants filed a motion to compel the United
States to disclose electronic surveillance information.24 In response
to the motion, the Government filed an affidavit by the Attorney
General.25 The affidavit stated, “[T]he Attorney General approved
the wiretaps ‘to gather intelligence information deemed necessary to
protect the nation from attempts of domestic organizations to attack
and subvert the existing structure of the Government.’”26 The
Government argued that even though the surveillance was conducted
without prior judicial approval, it was still lawful because it was a
“reasonable exercise of the President’s power . . . to protect the
national security.”27 The District Court for the Eastern District of
Michigan disagreed with the Government and held that the
surveillance violated the Fourth Amendment.28 In deciding that the
surveillance was unlawful, the Supreme Court of the United States
emphasized that the issue in Keith was “only the domestic aspects of

defendants. Id. (reviewing United States v. Sinclair, 321 F. Supp. 1074 (E.D.
Mich. 1971)). “The government then filed a writ of mandamus in the Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit to compel Judge Keith to vacate his order . . . .” Id.
23
Keith, 407 U.S. at 299.
24
Id. at 299–300.
25
Id. at 300.
26
Id.
27
Id. at 301 (The President’s power was exercised through the Attorney
General.). Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968
created two exceptions to the juridical approval: as to foreign threats, “[n]othing
contained in this chapter . . . shall limit the constitutional power of the President [1]
to take such measures as he deems necessary to protect the Nation against actual or
potential attack or other hostile acts of a foreign power, [2] to obtain foreign
intelligence information deemed essential to the security of the United States, or [3]
to protect national security information against foreign intelligence activities” and
as to domestic threats, “[n]or shall anything contained in this chapter be deemed to
limit the constitutional power of the President to take such measures as he deems
necessary to protect the United States [4] against the overthrow of the Government
by force or other unlawful means, or [5] against any other clear and present danger
to the structure or existence of the Government.” Seamon & Gardner, supra note
2, at 330–31.
28
United States v. Sinclair, 321 F. Supp. 1074 (E.D. Mich. 1971), aff’d, rev’d
sub nom. United States v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for E.D. of Mich., 444 F.2d 651 (6th Cir.
1971), cert. granted, 403 U.S. 297 (1972).
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national security” and not “activities of foreign powers or their
agents.”29
Because the ruling in Keith only applied to domestic national
security, the President still had power to authorize electronic
surveillance against foreign powers to protect the nation.30 Congress
perceived that the surveillance power was being abused and needed
to be controlled.31 After the ruling in Keith, Congress passed FISA to
address abusive uses of electronic surveillance.32 A committee
established by Congress to investigate abusive use of electronic
surveillance discovered that “at least since the administration of
Franklin Roosevelt in 1940,” many presidents authorized electronic
surveillance “for national security purposes” without judicial
approval.33 The committee reported the following numbers:
•

•

•

•

29

Nearly a quarter of a million first class letters were
opened and photographed in the United States by
the CIA between 1953–1973, producing a CIA
computerized index of nearly one and one-half
million names.
At least 130,000 first class letters were opened and
photographed by the FBI between 1940–1966 in
eight U.S. cities.
Some 300,000 individuals were indexed in a CIA
computer system and separate files were created
on approximately 7,200 Americans and over 100
domestic groups during the course of CIA’s
Operation CHAOS (1967–1973).
Millions of private telegrams sent from, to, or
through the United States were obtained by the
National Security Agency from 1947 to 1975

Keith, 407 U.S. at 321–24; see also Seamon & Gardner, supra note 2, at
330–32.
30
Blum, supra note 7, at 274.
31
Id. at 287.
32
Id. at 275; Seamon & Gardner, supra note 2, at 334–37.
33
For a more detailed list of the committee’s report, see Blum, supra note 7, at
275; see also Banks, supra note 1, at 1226–27.
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under a secret arrangement with three United
States telegraph companies.
An estimated 100,000 Americans were the
subjects of United States Army intelligence files
created between the mid-[1960s] and 1971.
Intelligence files on more than 11,000 individuals
and groups were created by the Internal Revenue
Services between 1969 and 1973 and tax
investigations were started on the basis of political
rather than tax criteria.
At least 26,000 individuals were at one point
catalogued on an FBI list of persons to be rounded
up in the event of a “national emergency.”34

Electronic surveillance was also used for political purposes.
Presidents Johnson and Nixon used electronic surveillance for
political purposes, such as eavesdropping on United States citizens
who opposed Vietnam War protesters.35 In the 1970s, President
Nixon refused to disclose tape recordings of his political opponents
for national security purposes.36 In light of these activities, Congress
believed it was necessary to set boundaries on presidential discretion
by passing FISA.
A.

FISA

In 1978, Congress passed FISA, which allowed for electronic
surveillance of foreign powers or an agent of a foreign power—as
specially defined in section 1801 of the FISA.37 According to FISA,
a foreign power is:

34

Senate Select Comm. To Study Governmental Operations, Intelligence
Activities and the Rights of Americans, S. REP. No. 94-755, at 6–7 (1976),
reviewed by Banks, supra note 1, at 1226–27.
35
Blum, supra note 7, at 275; Nicholas J. Whilt, The Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act: Protecting the Civil Liberties that Make Defense of Our Nation
Worthwhile, 35 SW. U. L. REV. 361, 385 (2006).
36
Banks, supra note 1, at 1225.
37
Allan N. Kornblum & Lubomyr M. Jachnycky, America’s Secret Court:
Listening in on Espionage and Terrorism, 24 JUDGES’ J. 15, 15 (1985).
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(1) a foreign government or any component thereof,
whether or not recognized by the United States;
(2) a faction of a foreign nation or nations, not
substantially composed of United States persons;
(3) an entity that is openly acknowledged by a foreign
government or governments to be directed and
controlled by such foreign government or
governments;
(4) a group engaged in international terrorism or
activities in preparation therefor;
(5) a foreign-based political organization, not
substantially composed of United States persons;
(6) an entity that is directed and controlled by a
foreign government or governments; or
(7) an entity not substantially composed of United
States persons that is engaged in the international
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.38
An agent of a foreign power means any person other than a
United States person who:
(A) acts in the United States as an officer or employee
of a foreign power, or as a member of a foreign power
as defined in subsection (a)(4) of this section;
(B) acts for or on behalf of a foreign power which
engages in clandestine intelligence activities in the
United States contrary to the interests of the United
States, when the circumstances of such person’s
presence in the United States indicate that such person
may engage in such activities in the United States, or
when such person knowingly aids or abets any person
in the conduct of such activities or knowingly
conspires with any person to engage in such activities;
(C) engages in international terrorism or activities in
preparation therefore;

38

50 U.S.C. § 1801(a)(1)–(7) (2012).
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(D) engages in the international proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction, or activities in
preparation therefor; or
(E) engages in the international proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction, or activities in
preparation therefor for or on behalf of a foreign
power39
FISA also defined electronic surveillance to include using an
electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance device to acquire any
wire or radio communication.40 FISA established two courts to

39

50 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(1)(A)–(E) (2012).
Amnesty Int’l USA v. McConnell, 646 F. Supp. 2d 633, 643 (S.D. N.Y.
2009), vacated, rev’d sub nom. Amnesty Int’l USA v. Clapper, 638 F.3d 118 (2d
Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013).
FISA defined electronic surveillance to include: (1) the
acquisition by an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance
device of the contents of any wire or radio communication sent
by or intended to be received by a particular, known United
States person who is in the United States, if the contents are
acquired by intentionally targeting that United States person,
under circumstances in which a person has a reasonable
expectation of privacy and a warrant would be required for law
enforcement purposes; (2) the acquisition by an electronic,
mechanical, or other surveillance device of the contents of any
wire communication to or from a person in the United States,
without the consent of any party thereto, if such acquisition
occurs in the United States, but does not include the acquisition
of those communications of computer trespassers that would be
permissible under section 2511(2)(i) of Title 18; (3) the
intentional acquisition by an electronic, mechanical, or other
surveillance device of the contents of any radio communication,
under circumstances in which a person has a reasonable
expectation of privacy and a warrant would be required for law
enforcement purposes, and if both the sender and all intended
recipients are located within the United States; or (4) the
installation or use of an electronic, mechanical, or other
surveillance device in the United States for monitoring to acquire
information, other than from a wire or radio communication,
under circumstances in which a person has a reasonable
expectation of privacy and a warrant would be required for law
enforcement purposes.
Id. at 122 n.2.
40
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govern applications for orders authorizing electronic surveillance: the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISA Court) and the Court
of Review (FISA Review Court).41 The FISA Court consisted of
seven district court judges appointed by the Chief Justice of the
United States Supreme Court, and the FISA Review Court consisted
of three district court or appellate court judges appointed by the Chief
Justice.42 The FISA Court has jurisdiction to review applications for
authorizing electronic surveillance, and the FISA Review Court has
jurisdiction to review applications that have been denied by the FISA
Court.43 A federal officer submits a written application to the FISA
Court, which includes identity, if known, or a description of the
specific target, a statement justifying his belief that “the target of the
electronic surveillance is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign
power,” and a description of the facilities at which the electronic
surveillance is directed, among other things.44 Because the FISA
Court proceedings are held privately, it is difficult to assess the
effectiveness of the court.45
B.

USA PATRIOT Act

In 2001, roughly five weeks after the September 11th attacks,
Congress passed the Uniting and Strengthening America by
Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct
Terrorism Act (USA PATRIOT Act), which amended several
provisions of FISA.46 The USA PATRIOT Act increased the number
of hours the government can conduct emergency warrantless
surveillance from twenty-four hours to seventy-two hours, expanded
the number of FISA Court judges from seven to eleven, “expanded
the availability of physical searches, pen registers, and trap and trace
41

Davis, supra note 8, at 192; Kornblum & Jachnycky, supra note 37, at 16.
Davis, supra note 8, at 192.
43
Id.
44
50 U.S.C § 1804(a)(3)(A) (2012).
45
Nola K. Breglio, Leaving FISA Behind: The Need to Return to Warrantless
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance, 113 YALE L.J. 179, 188 (2003). FISA Court
itself is also very secretive. Id. at 190. FISA Court is not listed in The United
States Government Manual or in The United States Court Directory, and the
location of the court was initially kept secret. Id.
46
Hund, supra note 8, at 191.
42
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devices, . . . allowed roving wiretaps[, and] . . . extended the time
periods for the surveillance from 90 days to 120 days.”47 But most
importantly, the USA PATRIOT Act lowered the legal standard for a
FISA warrant from a “primary purpose” to a “significant purpose.”48
To obtain a warrant for surveillance, the government has to assert
that the purpose of the surveillance is to obtain foreign intelligence
information, which, over time, has been interpreted as the “primary
purpose.”49 The primary purpose test is very important because it
distinguishes between “the purpose of gathering foreign intelligence
and the purpose of gathering evidence for a prosecution.”50
Information obtained under FISA may be used as evidence in
criminal prosecutions as long as the primary purpose of surveillance
under FISA was to gather foreign intelligence.51 The test draws a
line between foreign intelligence and criminal prosecution at the
outset of surveillance.52 The USA PATRIOT Act, however, lowered
the standard to a “significant purpose.”53 During the floor debate for
the USA PATRIOT Act, Senator Dianne Feinstein stated that
changing the requirement from “the [primary] purpose” to a
47

Blum, supra note 7, at 280.
Id.
49
Id. Before FISA was passed, some courts of appeals upheld warrantless
electronic surveillances that were conducted “for the sole or primary purpose of
obtaining foreign intelligence information.” Seamon & Gardner, supra note 2, at
359. See, e.g., United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593, 605 (3d Cir. 1974) (en
banc) (holding that the warrantless wiretaps were constitutional because they were
conducted solely for the purpose of gathering foreign intelligence information); see
also United States v. Brown, 484 F.2d 418, 427 (5th Cir. 1972) (holding that the
warrantless wiretaps were constitutional because they were conducted for the
purpose of gathering foreign intelligence). But see United States v. Truong, 629
F.2d 908, 911 (4th Cir. 1980) (holding that warrantless electronic surveillances
were unconstitutional to the extent the government switched the focus of
investigation for criminal prosecution). After the passage of FISA, courts applied
the primary purpose test to surveillance authorized under FISA. Seamon &
Gardner, supra note 2, at 364. See, e.g., United States v. Megahey, 553 F. Supp.
1180 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), aff’d sub nom. United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59 (2d
Cir. 1984) (upheld Defendant’s conviction because the government’s primary
purpose for the surveillance was to obtain foreign intelligence).
50
Seamon & Gardner, supra note 2, at 365.
51
Id. at 366.
52
See id. at 367.
53
Blum, supra note 7, at 281.
48
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“significant purpose” was to make it “easier to collect foreign
intelligence information.54 Senator Feinstein explained:
[I]n today’s world things are not so simple. In many
cases, surveillance will have two key goals—the
gathering of foreign intelligence, and the gathering of
evidence for a criminal prosecution. . . .
Rather than forcing law enforcement to decide which
purpose is primary . . . this bill strikes a new balance.
It will now require that a “significant” purpose of the
investigation must be foreign intelligence gathering to
proceed with surveillance under FISA.
The effect of this provision will be to make it easier
for law enforcement to . . . [use FISA] . . . where the
subject of the surveillance is both a potential source of
valuable intelligence and the potential target of a
criminal prosecution.55
The government’s electronic surveillance was conducted under
FISA (as amended by the USA PATRIOT Act) until 2008,56 with
small changes.57
During the period between the USA PATRIOT Act and the 2008
Amendments to FISA, the Bush administration created the Terrorist
Surveillance Program (TSP), which authorized the National Security
Agency (NSA) “to engage in electronic surveillance, without prior
judicial authorization, of communications between persons in other

54

Banks, supra note 1, at 1245.
147 CONG. REC. S10,990, S11,004 (2001) (statement of Sen. Feinstein),
quoted in Banks, supra note 1, at 1245.
56
Blum, supra note 7, at 283.
57
Hund, supra note 8, at 200. In 2004, Congress passed the “Lone Wolf”
Amendment, which expanded the definition of agent of a foreign power. Id. at 200.
The Lone Wolf Amendment does not require the government to prove a connection
with a foreign power when seeking surveillance authorization for nonresident
aliens. Id. at n.176.
55
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countries and persons inside the United States.”58 The Bush
administration directed the NSA to intercept electronic
communications that started or ended in the United States59 if the
government had “a reasonable basis to believe [the communication]
involve[d] al Qaeda or . . . its affiliates.”60 Although the TSP was
created shortly after the September 11th attacks, it was kept secret
until the New York Times disclosed its existence in 2005.61
Conducting wiretaps outside the United States does not require a
warrant, but the Bush administration directed the NSA to intercept
electronic communications that started and ended in the United
States.62 This required the NSA to obtain a FISA warrant, yet the
TSP did not fall under the framework of FISA.63 Some critics argued
that the TSP violated the Fourth Amendment and FISA, while the
Bush administration argued that the TSP was legal under Article II of
the Constitution.64 In 2007, however, “the government announced
that President Bush would not reauthorize the TSP because the
government had succeeded in obtaining an order under FISA

58

Michael Avery, The Constitutionality of Warrantless Electronic Surveillance
of Suspected Foreign Threats to the National Security of the United States, 62 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 541, 541 (2008).
59
Blum, supra note 7, at 283.
60
Avery, supra note 58, at 544–45.
NSA also targeted the communications of individuals it deemed
suspicious on the basis of NSA’s belief that the targeted
individuals had some unspecified “link” to al Qaeda or
unspecified related terrorist organizations, that they belonged to
an organization that the government considers to be “affiliated”
with al Qaeda, that they had provided some unspecified support
for al Qaeda, or that they “want to kill Americans.”
Id.
61
Blum, supra note 7, at 284. The New York Times published an article in
2005 revealing TSP and what NSA was authorized to do under TSP. James Risen
& Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
16,
2005,
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/16/politics/16program.html?pagewanted=all.
62
Blum, supra note 7, at 283.
63
Id.
64
Critics viewed FISA as “the exclusive statute monitoring foreign
surveillance” and the Bush administration viewed the TSP as the President
exercising his inherent authority as Commander in Chief. Id. at 284.
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allowing similar surveillance to be conducted under the Act.”65 In
2007, the FISA Court issued orders authorizing the government to
conduct surveillance on international communications that start or
end in the United States if there is “probable cause to believe that one
participant to the communication was a member or agent of al Qaeda
or an associated terrorist organization.”66 These new orders
subjected NSA’s current electronic surveillances to the FISA Court’s
approval.67 After the FISA Court narrowed its authorization, the
President asked Congress to amend FISA in order to provide
intelligence agencies “additional authority to meet the challenges of
modern technology and international terrorism.”68 Responding to the
President’s request, Congress passed the Protect America Act in
2007.69 Though it expired after six months, it set the stage for the
FISA Amendments Act in 2008.70 A few months after the Protect
America Act expired, Congress passed the FISA Amendments Act.71
Former Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the Office of Legal
Counsel, John Yoo, argued that the probable cause element72 of FISA
causes several problems.73 He explained the problem as follows:
when an al Qaeda leader has a cell phone with a hundred numbers in
its memory and ten of them are in the United States, the government
would need to obtain a warrant to conduct surveillance.74 However,
Yoo argued that the users of those ten numbers would probably not
fall under the category of agents of a foreign power under FISA
because the FISA Court would “probably require” evidence
identifying people who answered the phone, which the intelligence

65

Avery, supra note 58, at 582.
Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1144 (2013).
67
Id.
68
Id. “FISA also must keep pace with the continuing explosion in
communications technologies available both to law enforcement agencies and
potential surveillance targets.” Yoo, supra note 5, at n.82.
69
Owen Fiss, Even in a Time of Terror, 31 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 9 (2012).
70
Id.
71
Id.
72
FISA requires the government to show that they have a probable cause to
believe that someone is an agent of a foreign power when obtaining a warrant from
FISA Court. 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)(3) (2010).
73
Yoo, supra note 5, at 575.
74
Id. at 575–76.
66
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agencies would not know immediately.75 He further argued that in
the case of e-mail addresses, it is even more difficult to establish
probable cause because it is not immediately obvious who holds
which email address.76 However, despite Yoo’s argument, the
statistics showed that most of the applications seeking a surveillance
warrant were granted.77
C.

FISA Amendments Act of 2008

In 2008, Congress passed an amendment to FISA.78 Under the
FISA Amendments Act, “the Attorney General and the Director of
National Intelligence may authorize jointly, for a period of up to
[one] year from the effective date of the authorization, the targeting
of persons reasonably believed to be located outside the United States
to acquire foreign intelligence information.”79 There are several
limitations when carrying out the surveillance authorized under the
new amendment.80 The government:
(1) may not intentionally target any person known at
the time of acquisition to be located in the United
States;
(2) may not intentionally target a person reasonably
believed to be located outside the United States if the
purpose of such acquisition is to target a particular,
known person reasonably believed to be in the United
States;
(3) may not intentionally target a United States person
reasonably believed to be located outside the United
States;
(4) may not intentionally acquire any communication
as to which the sender and all intended recipients are

75

Id.
Id.
77
See infra note 188 for the statistics of FISA Court granting surveillance
warrants.
78
50 U.S.C. § 1881a (2012).
79
50 U.S.C. § 1881a(a) (2012).
80
50 U.S.C. § 1881a(b)(1)-(5) (2012).
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known at the time of the acquisition to be located in
the United States; and
(5) shall be conducted in a manner consistent with the
fourth amendment to the Constitution of the United
States.81
Unlike FISA, the FISA Amendments Act protects all Americans
by adding section 1881a(b) limitations.82 On the other hand, the new
amendment changed a handful of provisions, loosening warrant
procedures.83 Under the FISA Amendments Act, the Attorney
General does not need to identify the specific place at which the
surveillance will be conducted.84 The FISA Court no longer looks at
individual surveillance applications, but instead looks to see if the
government followed procedural requirements under FISA.85 The
FISA Amendments Act also increases the exigent circumstance
exception to seven days.86 As long as the government presents
certification to the FISA Court within seven days, the government
can begin surveillance under an exigent circumstance.87 When there
is no exigent circumstance, the Attorney General and the Director of
National Intelligence must submit a certification to the FISA Court,
and the court must review the certification, targeting procedures, and
minimization procedures.88 If the FISA Court finds that the

81

Id.
Under FISA, there was no specific procedure for obtaining a warrant for
conducting surveillance on Americans outside the United States. Jonathan D.
Forgang, “The Right of the People”: The FISA Amendments Act of 2008, and
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance of Americans Overseas, 78 FORDHAM L. REV.
217, 238 (2009).
83
Id. at 238.
84
50 U.S.C. § 1881a(g)(4) (2012).
85
50 U.S.C. § 1881a(i)(2) (2012). Under FISA Amendments Act, the
government does not need to disclose every targeted individual to the FISA Court.
Fiss, supra note 69, at 18. This allows the FISA Court to issue “blanket”
authorization, allowing the government to target a large group of people. Id.
86
50 U.S.C. § 1881a(g)(1)(B) (2012). Attorney General and the Director of
National Intelligence determine that exigent circumstances exist when there is not
enough time to obtain authorization. See 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(c)(2) (2012).
87
Id.
88
50 U.S.C. § 1881a(i)(2) (2012).
82
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government satisfied the statute, it will approve the procedures for
conducting surveillance.89
1.

Certification

The Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence
are required to provide a written certificate to the FISA Court.90 A
certification must attest that there are procedures to ensure that
targeted persons are reasonably believed to be located outside the
United States and to prevent the intentional acquisition of
communications where participants are known to be located in the
United States.91 It must also attest that the minimization procedures
meet the definition of minimization procedures under section 1801(h)
or section 1821(4).92 There is an exception to this rule. The FISA
Amendments Act gives the Attorney General and the Director of
National Intelligence seven days to submit a certification to the FISA
Court if time did not permit them to submit a certification prior to
implementing an authorization of surveillance.93
2.

Targeting Procedures

The Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence
are required to adopt targeting procedures to ensure that targeted
persons under the authorization are limited to “persons reasonably
believed to be located outside the United States” and to prevent the
intentional acquisition of any communications between people who
were known to be located in the United States at the time of the
acquisition.94 The procedure must also prevent the government from
intentionally targeting persons reasonably believed to be located
outside the United States if the purpose of acquiring the
89

50 U.S.C. § 1881a(i)(3) (2012).
50 U.S.C. § 1881a(g)(1)(A) (2012).
91
50 U.S.C. § 1881a(g)(2)(A)(i) (2012).
92
50 U.S.C. § 1881a(g)(2)(A)(ii) (2012).
93
50 U.S.C. § 1881a(g)(1)(B) (2012). When FISA was first established, the
government had twenty-four hours to obtain a warrant in cases of emergency
surveillance. Pub.L. No. 95-511, § 105(e), 92 Stat. 1792 (1978). The USA
PATRIOT Act increased this to seventy-two hours. Blum, supra note 7, at 280.
94
50 U.S.C. § 1881a(d) (2012).
90
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communication is to target a particular, known person reasonably
believed to be in the United States.95
3.

Minimization Procedures

The Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence
are required to adopt minimization procedures as defined under
sections 1801(h)(1) and 1821(4)(A) of FISA.96 Minimization
procedures are “specific procedures . . . that are reasonably designed .
. . to minimize the acquisition and retention, and prohibit the
dissemination, of nonpublicly available information concerning
unconsenting United States persons consistent with the need of the
United States to obtain, produce, and disseminate foreign intelligence
information.”97
The minimization procedures ensure that
nonpublicly available information about any United States person
that is not foreign intelligence information will not be disseminated
without such person’s consent. However, when the information is
evidence of a crime, the statute allows the government to retain and
disseminate such information for law enforcement purposes.98
If the FISA Court finds that one of the three requirements failed
to satisfy the statute, the court will order the government to correct
any deficiencies within thirty days or not to implement the
authorization submitted for approval.99 The government has the
option to appeal the FISA Court’s decision to the FISA Review
Court.100 If the government has already begun implementing the
authorization before submitting a certification to the FISA Court, the
government may continue acquiring surveillance while the case is
pending for rehearing or until the FISA Review Court enters an
order.101

95

Id.
50 U.S.C. § 1881a(e)(1) (2012).
97
50 U.S.C. § 1801(h)(1) (2012); 50 U.S.C. § 1821(4)(A) (2012).
98
50 U.S.C. § 1821(4)(C) (2012).
99
50 U.S.C. § 1881a(i)(3)(B) (2012).
100
50 U.S.C. § 1881a(i)(4) (2012).
101
Id.
96
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Fourth Amendment

Respondents in Clapper argued that the FISA Amendments Act
violates the Fourth Amendment because it “fails to protect the
privacy interest of Americans in the content of their telephone calls
and emails.”102 The Fourth Amendment of the Constitution protects
people from unreasonable searches and seizures.103 When FISA was
passed, however, Congress did not require the Fourth Amendment’s
traditional probable cause standard.104 The government could use
information gathered under FISA in criminal investigations, as FISA
“simply requires probable cause to believe that the target of the
electronic surveillance is a foreign agent and the targeted facility is,
or is about to be, used by a foreign agent.”105 If the target is a United
States person, the government needs to show that the target is “an
employee or agent of a foreign power,” and if the foreign power is a
terrorist group, “it can be fairly assumed that . . . the target is a
terrorist and thus that the probable case requirement has been
satisfied.”106 Taking it one step further, surveillance under FISA is
allowed, “even if the foreign power is another nation . . . and there is
thus no reason to suspect the target of criminal activity.”107 To
maintain the balance between national security and our Constitutional
protection, FISA’s lowered probable cause standard only applied to
surveillances where the purpose was to gather foreign intelligence.108
Many scholars have criticized the change in wording from “primary
purpose” to “significant purpose” for the probable cause standard109
in the USA PATRIOT Act because they viewed this change to mean
that United States citizens are more exposed to electronic

102

Amnesty Int’l USA v. McConnell, 646 F. Supp. 2d 633, 642 (S.D.N.Y.
2009), vacated, rev’d sub nom. Amnesty Int’l USA v. Clapper, 638 F.3d 118 (2d
Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013).
103
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
104
Hardin, supra note 4, at 292.
105
Id.
106
Fiss, supra note 69, at 21.
107
Id.
108
Hardin, supra note 4, at 292.
109
Blum, supra note 7, at 282.
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surveillance of their international communications.110 Law professor
Stephen Schulhofer at New York University argued that this change
exposed “U[nited] S[tates] citizens and foreign nationals . . . to
‘broad FISA surveillance’ when the government’s primary purpose is
not to gather foreign intelligence but instead to gather evidence for
use at a criminal trial.”111 This change allowed the government to
conduct electronic surveillance authorized under FISA for the
purposes of finding evidence in criminal prosecutions.112 Against
these critics, the FISA Review Court upheld the change in In re
Sealed Case, arguing that the government’s primary purpose is to
stop terrorism, and that criminal prosecutions are often “interrelated
with other techniques used to frustrate a foreign power’s efforts.”113
The FISA Review Court further argued that “unless the government’s
‘sole objective’ was to obtain evidence of a past crime, a FISA
warrant should be granted.”114 In its discussion of the Fourth
Amendment, the FISA Review Court distinguished the criminal
prosecution from foreign intelligence as applied to ordinary crimes,
thereby holding that the USA PATRIOT Act is constitutional.115
Hardin criticized this holding because he believed the FISA Review
Court failed to consider the constitutionality of the USA PATRIOT
Act in relation to ordinary crimes.116 Instead, Hardin opined that by
broadening “the applicability of FISA to ordinary crimes inextricably
intertwined with foreign intelligence activity,” the USA PATRIOT
Act went beyond what the Fourth Amendment allows.117

110

Banks, supra note 1, at 1213. See Part II.B for the discussion regarding
how the court interpreted “purpose” as “primary purpose.”
111
STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, THE ENEMY WITHIN INTELLIGENCE GATHERING,
LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE WAKE OF SEPTEMBER 11 44
(Century Foundation Press, 2002), construed in Blum, supra note 7, at 281–82.
112
Banks, supra note 1, at 1213.
113
In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 743 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002).
114
Blum, supra note 7, at 282.
115
In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 743 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002), construed in
Hardin, supra note 4, at 333.
116
Id. Hardin foresaw a situation in which “authorities conducting a FISA
surveillance . . . conceivably put greater emphasis on collecting evidence regarding
a murder investigation in which the counterintelligence information is
insignificant.” Id. at 333–34.
117
Id. at 345.
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The FISA Amendments Act made an effort to ensure that the
Fourth Amendment would be protected. Section 1881a(b)(5) states
that an authorized acquisition of foreign intelligence information
“shall be conducted in a manner consistent with the [F]ourth
[A]mendment to the Constitution of the United States.”118 However,
“it is unclear what this additional requirement will add” to
conducting electronic surveillance overseas,119 because if the target is
a foreigner not in the United States, the government does not have to
prove that the target is associated with a foreign power; the
government need only prove that the target is a foreigner abroad.120
Also, the FISA Amendments Act kept the “significant purpose”
standard from the USA PATRIOT Act.121
Once the FISA Amendments Act was passed, Respondents filed
suit against the government seeking a declaration that the Act is
unconstitutional and an injunction against surveillance authorized
under the Act.122
III.

FACTS OF CLAPPER V. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL USA

Respondents were attorneys, human rights, labor, legal, and
media organizations “whose work require[d] them to engage in
sensitive and sometimes privileged telephone and e-mail
communications” with persons not in the United States.123 Many of

118

50 U.S.C § 1881a(b)(5) (2012).
Blum, supra note 7, at 298.
120
Fiss, supra note 69, at 21.
121
50 U.S.C. § 1881a(g)(2)(A)(v) (2012).
122
Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2012).
123
Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 14, Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l
USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2012) (No. 11-1025).
Some [respondents] communicate by telephone and email with
people located in geographic areas that are a special focus of the
U.S. government’s counterterrorism or diplomatic efforts . . .
some [respondents] communicate with attorneys or co-counsel
overseas . . . some [respondents] communicate . . . with the
family members of individuals who have been detained by the
U.S. military or CIA . . . some [respondents] communicate . . .
with political dissidents and human rights activists abroad . . .
[and] some [respondents] communicate by telephone and email
with foreign journalists, researchers, and other experts overseas.
119
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these people were located in areas that were a special focus of the
U.S. government.124 Sylvia Royce and Scott McKay were attorneys
whose clients were accused terrorists and Guantanamo Bay
detainees.125 They regularly communicated with their clients and
their clients’ families, who were abroad.126 Because their clients
were alleged to have been involved in terrorism, the nature of the
conversations often related to terrorism, national defense, or foreign
affairs.127 Joanne Mariner was a human rights researcher who
tracked down people the CIA rendered to other countries.128 The
nature of her job required her to frequently communicate with
detainees, political activists, journalists, and fixers from all over the
world; the CIA stamped many of these people as being involved in
terrorist organizations.129
When Congress passed the FISA
Amendments Act, Respondents brought an action seeking a
declaration that the new amendment was unconstitutional and an
injunction seeking to enjoin any foreign intelligence surveillance
from being conducted under the amendment.130 Respondents alleged
that the new amendment compromised their ability to engage in
confidential communications via telephone and e-mail due to who the
Respondents communicated with.131 The United States government
was likely to target some of the people Respondents communicated
with because they were people the United States government
believed were associated with terrorist organizations and are located
in areas that were a “special focus” of the United States
government.132 Respondents also alleged that they were compelled
“to take costly and burdensome measures to protect the privacy of
their communications.”133 Respondents had to assume that the
Brief for Respondents at 16–17, Clapper, 133 S. Ct. 1138 (No. 11–1025).
124
Brief for the Plaintiffs-Appellants, supra note 123, at 14.
125
Brief for Respondents, supra note 123, at 16.
126
Id. at 15–16.
127
Brief for Comm. on Civil Rights of the Ass’n of the Bar of N.Y.C. at 3,
Clapper, 133 S. Ct. 1138 (No. 11-1025).
128
Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1158.
129
Id.
130
Id. at 1138.
131
Id.
132
Brief for the Plaintiffs-Appellants, supra note 123, at 15–17.
133
Id. at 17, 19.

466

Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary

34-2

government may monitor every international communication;
therefore, Respondents had to either forego the communication or
travel abroad to have an in-person conversation.134
IV.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

To establish Article III standing, Plaintiffs had to show: (1) they
suffered an actual and imminent injury that was concrete and
particularized, (2) there was a causal connection between the injury
and the Defendant’s actions, and (3) it was likely that a favorable
decision in the case would redress the injury.135
A.

United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York

The District Court for the Southern District of New York held
that Plaintiffs lacked standing to bring a pre-enforcement challenge
against the FISA Amendments Act. Plaintiffs argued that they only
needed to demonstrate “an actual and well-founded fear that the law
[would] be enforced against” them to satisfy the actual and imminent
injury requirement because they were bringing a pre-enforcement
challenge to a statute on First Amendment grounds.136 The District
Court responded that “[t]he plaintiffs [could] only demonstrate an
abstract fear that their communications [would] be monitored.”137
The District Court stated that the FISA Amendments Act does not
authorize the automatic surveillance of persons such as Plaintiffs; it
requires the government to seek authorization from the FISA Court.
The District Court referred to United Presbyterian Church in the
United States of America v. Reagan and stated that the courts have
rejected standing based on a fear of surveillance, similar to the fear of
surveillance in this case.138 The District Court concluded that the
134

Brief for Respondents, supra note 123, at 20.
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
136
Amnesty Int’l USA v. McConnell, 646 F. Supp. 2d 633, 644 (S.D.N.Y.
2009), vacated, rev’d sub nom. Amnesty Int’l USA v. Clapper, 638 F.3d 118 (2d
Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013).
137
Id. at 645.
138
Id. Plaintiffs in United Presbyterian Church in the United States of
America v. Reagan, 738 F.2d 1375 (D.C. Cir. 1984), challenged the
135
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link between Plaintiffs’ fear of injury and the FISA Amendments Act
was attenuated because the statute created a judicial body (FISA
Court) to review each application for surveillance in order to ensure
that it complied with the Fourth Amendment.139
The District Court also rejected Plaintiffs’ second argument—that
Plaintiffs had to take costly and burdensome measures to ensure
confidential communication with people outside of the United
States.140 The District Court held that this argument could not be
linked to the FISA Amendments Act because that action resulted
from their fear of surveillance.141 Plaintiffs’ incurred costs could not
be the basis for standing because they were not independent of their
first actual and imminent injury argument.142
B.

United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

The Second Circuit vacated the District Court’s decision and held
that the Plaintiffs had standing.143 The Second Circuit interpreted the
elements of standing differently than the District Court.144 As to the
actual and imminent injury element, the Second Circuit reasoned that
“[w]hen a plaintiff asserts a present injury based on conduct taken in
anticipation of future government action, [the court] evaluate[s] the
likelihood that the future action will in fact come to pass.”145 As to
the traceability element, the Second Circuit considered whether the
Plaintiffs’ present injury “resulted from some irrational or otherwise
clearly unreasonable fear of future government action that is unlikely

constitutionality of Executive Order No. 12333, which allows intelligence agencies
to apply to the Attorney General for approval to collect, retain, or disseminate
intelligence information. The court in this case held that the plaintiffs lacked
standing because they failed to show that “any specific action is threatened or even
contemplated against them.” Id. at 1380.
139
McConnell, 646 F. Supp. 2d at 646.
140
Id. at 653.
141
Id.
142
Id. at 658.
143
Amnesty Int’l USA v. Clapper, 638 F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 2011), cert.
granted, 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013).
144
Id. at 131–132.
145
Id. at 135 (emphasis omitted).
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to take place.”146 The Second Circuit agreed with Plaintiffs that the
government was likely to conduct surveillance on Plaintiffs’
communications in the future because Plaintiffs engaged in
communications with individuals likely to be targeted by the
government.147 The Second Circuit further held that fears of future
surveillance were fairly traceable to the FISA Amendments Act
because “they [we]re based on a reasonable interpretation of the
challenged statute and a realistic understanding of the world.”148
Unlike the District Court, the Second Circuit concluded that the FISA
Court by itself did not preclude standing because virtually every
application submitted to the FISA Court was approved.149 The
Second Circuit held that Plaintiffs had standing because their fears of
electronic surveillance and actions they took to avoid possible
surveillance constituted actual and imminent injuries traceable to the
FISA Amendments Act.150
V.

ANALYSIS OF OPINION

In a 5–4 decision, the Supreme Court held that Respondents did
not have standing under Article III of the Constitution because they
did not suffer any injury.151 The Court also held that the “costly and
burdensome measures” Respondents had to take to protect their
communications did not satisfy the injury requirement for
standing.152 The minority disagreed and concluded that at least some
of the respondents had standing because there was a high probability
that the government—at some time in the future—would monitor at
least some of Respondents’ communications.153
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Id.
Id. at 138. These are people ‘the U.S. government believes or believed to
be associated with terrorist organizations,’ ‘political and human rights activists who
oppose governments that are supported economically or militarily by the U.S.
government,’ and ‘people located in geographic areas that are a special focus of the
U.S. government’s counterterrorism or diplomatic efforts.’” Id. at 138–139.
148
Id. at 139.
149
Id.
150
Id. at 140.
151
Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1155 (2013).
152
Id. at 1143.
153
Id. at 1155 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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Justice Alito’s Majority Opinion

Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court in which Chief
Justice Roberts, Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Thomas
joined.154 Justice Alito began his discussion by briefly explaining
section 1881a and Respondents’ complaint, and stating the issue of
this case—Article III standing.155 The Court held that Respondents
lacked Article III standing because their “theory of future injury
[was] too speculative” to satisfy the requirement that injury must be
“certainly impending,” and even if they satisfied the “certainly
impending” requirement, “they still would not be able to establish
that . . . injury [was] fairly traceable to [section] 1881a.”156 The
Court pointed out that Congress enacted FISA against the Court’s
decision in United States v. United States District Court for Eastern
District of Michigan.157 However, with the major changes, the FISA
Amendments Act “established a new and independent source of
intelligence collection authority, beyond that granted in traditional
FISA.”158 The government seeking surveillance authorization is no
longer required to (1) show probable cause that their target is a
“foreign power or agent of a foreign power,” or (2) “specify the
nature and location of each of the particular facilities or places” at
which the surveillance will occur.159
Justice Alito noted that Respondents asserted two theories of
Article III standing, which he rejected later in the opinion.160
Respondents claimed that “there [was] an objectively reasonable
likelihood that their communications [would] be acquired under [the
FISA Amendments Act] at some point in the future, thus causing
them injury,” and that the risk of surveillance was “so substantial that
154

Id.
Id. at 1142 (majority opinion).
156
Id. at 1143.
157
Id. See United States v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for E.D. of Mich., S. Div. 92 S. Ct.
2125 (1972). This case “implicitly suggested that a special framework for foreign
intelligence surveillance might be constitutionally permissible.” Clapper, 133 S.
Ct. at 1143.
158
Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1144.
159
Id. See supra Part II.C for FISA Amendments Act in detail.
160
Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1146. See supra Part III.A–B for Justice Alito’s
discussion regarding why Respondents’ two theories of Article III standing fail.
155
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they [had] been forced to take costly and burdensome measures” to
protect their international communications, thus causing present
injury traceable to the FISA Amendments Act.161
Starting with a brief history of Article III standing, Justice Alito
began to lay out standards to meet Article III requirements.162 The
issue in Clapper was whether Respondents satisfied the injury-in-fact
element, and Justice Alito stated that threatened injury must have
been certainly impending to satisfy the injury-in-fact element.163 The
Court held that Respondents’ injury-in-fact argument failed because
they relied on “a highly attenuated chain of possibilities,” which did
not satisfy the certainly impending requirement.164 Justice Alito
further noted that even if Respondents satisfied the injury-in-fact
requirement, their argument failed to show that their injury could be
fairly traceable to the FISA Amendments Act.165 Then Justice Alito
provided reasons why Respondents’ speculative chain of possibilities
failed to show that “injury based on potential future surveillance
[was] certainly impending or [was] fairly traceable to [the FISA
Amendments Act].”166 First, Justice Alito argued that Respondents
assumed that the government may target their international
communication without providing any factual evidence that their
communications would be targeted.167 Second, even if Respondents
could show that the government would imminently target their
international communications, they could not satisfy the fairly
traceable requirement because there were ways the government could
conduct the surveillance other than under the FISA Amendments

161

Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1146.
Id. at 1146–47.
163
Id. at 1147.
164
Id. at 1147–48. See also Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 500–
01 (2009) (rejecting a standing theory premised on a speculative chain of
possibilities).
165
Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1147–52; see also Am. Civ. Liberties Union v. Nat’l.
Sec. Agency, 493 F.3d 644, 673–74 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that plaintiffs lacked
standing to bring claim against the NSA’s use of warrantless wiretaps).
166
Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1150.
167
Id. at 1149 (majority opinion). But see id. at 1157–60 (Breyer, J.
dissenting) (arguing that the injury-in-fact is not speculative).
162
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Act.168 Third, even if the government had sought the FISA Court’s
authorization, Respondents could only speculate as to whether the
FISA Court would authorize the surveillance.169 Fourth, even if the
government had obtained the FISA Court’s approval, it was unclear
whether the government would successfully acquire the
communications of Respondents’ foreign contacts.170 And lastly,
even if the government had conducted surveillance of Respondents’
foreign contacts, Respondents could only speculate as to whether
their own communications would be acquired.171
Respondents also argued that they were suffering ongoing
injuries because they were taking “costly and burdensome measures
to protect the confidentiality of their communications” from the
government.172
Noting the Second Circuit’s holding that
Respondents’ ongoing injuries were fairly traceable to the FISA
Amendments Act, the Court held that the Second Circuit analyzed
the issue “under a relaxed reasonableness standard . . . improperly
allow[ing] [R]espondents to establish standing.”173 Justice Alito
argued that Respondents could not establish standing “merely by
inflicting harm on themselves based on their fears of hypothetical
future harm that [was] not certainly impending.”174 He feared that
accepting fears of hypothetical further harm as satisfying the injury
requirement would lower the standard for Article III standing.175
Further supporting his argument that Respondents were inflicting
harm on their own, Justice Alito pointed out that the ongoing injuries
Respondents claimed to have suffered could not be fairly traceable to
168

Id. at 1149 (majority opinion). See infra note 188 for FISA Court’s
approval of authorization. Justice Alito states that the Court is “reluctant to
endorse standing theories that require guesswork as to how independent decisionmakers will exercise their judgment,” but looking at the statistics, the majority of
the applications filed with the FISA Court has been approved. Clapper, 133 S. Ct.
at 1150.
169
Id. at 1149–50.
170
Id. at 1150.
171
Id.
172
Id. at 1151.
173
Id. The Second Circuit held that Respondents suffered present injuries in
fact stemming from a reasonable fear of future harmful government conduct.
Amnesty Int’l USA v. Clapper, 638 F.3d 118, 138 (2d Cir. 2011).
174
Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1151.
175
Id.

472

Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary

34-2

the FISA Amendments Act because Respondents had engaged in
similar measures to protect their communications even before the Act
was enacted.176 Referring to the Court’s decision in Laird v.
Tatum,177 the Court held that fear of surveillance and costs they
incurred to avoid such surveillance could not establish standing.178
Then Justice Alito reasoned that Respondents incorrectly
compared the injuries they incurred to the injuries incurred by
plaintiffs in previous cases where this Court upheld standing.179 In
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services, Inc.,
the Court held that Friends of the Earth and Citizens Local
Environmental Action Network (FOE) had standing because Laidlaw
Environmental Services’ disposal of mercury into the waterway
“directly affected [members of FOE’s] recreational, aesthetic, and
economic interests.”180
Justice Alito distinguished this from
Respondents’ case by pointing out that the unlawful discharges of
mercury were ongoing, whereas in Respondents’ case, electronic

176

Id. at 1152.
408 U.S. 1 (1972).
178
Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1152.
179
Id. at 1153. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc.,
528 U.S. 167, 184 (2000) (holding that the plaintiffs had standing because “a
company’s continuous and pervasive illegal discharges of pollutants into a river”
causing nearby residents to “curtail their recreational use of that waterway and . . .
subject[ing] them to other economic and aesthetic harm[]” were “concededly
ongoing”); Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 475 (1987) (holding that the plaintiff
had standing because he demonstrated that he “could not exhibit the films without
incurring a risk of injury to his reputation and of an impairment of his political
career.”); Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 156 (2010)
(holding that conventional alfalfa farmers had standing because genetically
engineered alfalfa seed fields were being plants within the bees’ pollination range).
180
528 U.S. at 169. Friends of the Earth and Citizens Local Environmental
Action Network (FOE) filed suit against Laidlaw Environmental Services
(Laidlaw) alleging noncompliance with the National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System (NPDES) permit, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, and
an award of civil penalties. Id. at 173–74. NPDES permitted Laidlaw to discharge
treated water but limited discharging pollutant; however, Laidlaw exceeded the
limit on multiple occasions by discharging mercury into the waterway. Id. at 176.
Laidlaw argued that FOE lacked standing because FOE failed to show that any of
their members faced the threat of any injury from Laidlaw’s activities. Id. at 177.
177
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surveillance of Respondents’ communication could be done through
ways other than utilizing the FISA Amendments Act.181
In Meese v. Keene, the Court held that Keene had standing
because his personal, political, and professional reputation would
suffer, and his ability to obtain re-election would be impaired if he
were to exhibit the films marked as “political propaganda.”182 Meese
was distinguished from Respondents’ case because in Meese, the
films were already labeled as “political propaganda” and the labeling
was regulated by the statute in question, whereas in Respondents’
case, it was mere speculation as to whether the government would
subject Respondents’ communications to electronic surveillance
using the FISA Amendments Act.183 In Monsanto Co v. Geertson
Seed Farms, the Court held that the farmers did have standing to seek
injunctive relief because if Roundup Ready Alfalfa were deregulated,
farmers’ organic and conventional alfalfa crops would be infected
with the engineered gene.184 Justice Alito distinguished this case
from Respondents’ case because the farmers presented concrete
evidence of fear that the genetically engineered alfalfa seeds were
being planted in all the major alfalfa seed production areas well
within the bees’ pollination range.185 With these three cases, Justice
Alito seemed to emphasize that Respondents failed to provide
sufficient evidence to trace their alleged injury to the FISA
Amendments Act.
Respondents alternatively argued that the government’s
surveillance activities were insulated from judicial review.186 The
Court disagreed with this argument.187 The Court held that the FISA
Amendments Act is not insulated from judicial review because the

181

Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1141.
481 U.S. at 467. A member of the California State Senate brought suit to
enjoin the use of term “political propaganda” to certain Canadian Films, as required
by Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938. Id. at 473.
183
Id.
184
Monsanto, 130 S. Ct. at 2752. Farmers of conventional alfalfa challenged
the decision of the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) to
deregulate a variety of genetically engineered alfalfa developed under license from
Monsanto Company. Id.
185
Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1154–55.
186
Id.
187
Id.
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FISA Court “evaluates the [g]overnment’s certifications, targeting
procedures, and minimization procedures.”188
In the majority’s opinion, Respondents did not provide any
concrete evidence to support their fear of future government
surveillance, but mere speculation of possible government actions.189
B.

Justice Breyer’s Dissent

Justice Breyer wrote the dissenting opinion in which Justice
Ginsburg, Justice Sotomayor, and Justice Kagan joined. Justice
Breyer disagreed with the Court that the injury was too
speculative.190 Justice Breyer listed three important ways the FISA
Amendments Act changed FISA.191 With these changes, the
government could obtain the FISA Court’s approval to conduct
electronic surveillance on “communications between places within
the United States and targets in foreign territories” by using “general
targeting and privacy-intrusion minimization procedures,” as long as
a significant purpose of the surveillance was to obtain foreign
intelligence information.192
Combined with the kinds of
communications Respondents engaged in, Justice Breyer argued that
Respondents’ future harm was not speculative.193 He was convinced
188

Id. at 1154. But cf. Nicholas J. Whilt, The Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act: Protecting the Civil Liberties that Make Defense of Our Nation
Worthwhile, 35 SW. U. L. REV. 361, n.4 (2006). Also, in FISA’s annual report to
Congress in 2012, it indicates that 1,789 applications were filed requesting an
authority to conduct electronic surveillance, and the FISA Court did not deny any
of the 1,789 applications. FISA’S 2012 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS,
https://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/2012rept.pdf (last visited Oct. 10, 2014).
189
Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1154.
190
Id. at 1155 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
191
Id.
FISA Amendments Act: eliminated the requirement that the
government describe to the [FISA Court] each specific target and identify each
facility at which its surveillance would be directed, . . . [and] the requirement that a
target [must] be a “foreign power or an agent of a foreign power,” [and it]
diminished the [FISA Court’s] authority to insist upon, and eliminated its authority
to supervise, instance-specific privacy-intrusion minimization procedures. Id. at
1156.
192
Id.
193
Id. at 1156–60. At the time this suit was filed, Scott McKay was a lawyer
representing Al-Hussayen, who is facing several civil cases, as well as criminal
charges after the September 11 attacks. Id. at 1156–57. He was also representing
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by Respondents’ contention that there was a “very high likelihood
that Government, acting under the authority of [the FISA Amendment
Act], [would] intercept at least some of the communications”
engaged in by Respondents.194 First, he said that Respondents
engaged in “electronic communications of a kind that the [FISA
Amendments Act], but not the prior Act” would authorize.195
Second, he said that Respondents had “a strong motive to engage in,
and the [g]overnment [had] a strong motive to listen to, conversations
of the kind described.”196 Third, he argued that the government’s
past behavior showed that it was likely to pursue surveillance of
electronic communications to seek information about terrorists and
detainees.197 Lastly, he mentioned that the government had the
capacity to conduct electronic surveillance because of the level of
technology available to the government.198 Also, he pointed out that

Khalid Sheik Mohammed, a detainee before the military commissions at
Guantanamo Bay. Id. at 1157. He communicated with these clients and other
people located outside the United States via telephone and e-mail. Id. Sylvia
Royce was an attorney representing Mohammedou Ould Salahi, a prisoner held at
Guantanamo Bay. Id. She communicated with Ould Salahi’s brother, who was
living in Germany. Id. Joanne Mariner is a human rights researcher and her work
requires her to communicate via e-mail with people whom the CIA has said are
associated with terrorist organizations. Id.
194
Id. Justice Breyer argues against Justice Alito’s arguments that the injury
alleged by Respondents’ is speculative, concluding that it is not speculative. Id. at
1160.
195
Id. at 1157–58. Compare with Justice Alito’s majority opinion where he
argues that the injury cannot be fairly traceable to § 1881a since Respondents have
taken similar measures to avoid surveillance even before FISA Amendments Act
was passed. Id. at 1152.
196
Id. at 1158. Compare with Justice Alito’s majority opinion where he argues
that it is speculative whether the government would target communications to
which Respondents are parties. Id. at 1149–50.
197
Id. at 1158. Compare with Justice Alito’s majority opinion where he argues
that Respondents can only speculate as to whether their own communications with
their foreign contacts would be incidentally acquired. Id. at 1150. Justice Breyer
argues that the nature of Respondents’ communication with their clients is likely to
be targeted by the government. Id. at 1158.
198
Id. at 1158–59. Compare with Justice Alito’s majority opinion where he
argues that Respondents’ alleged future injury in speculative because it is unsure
whether the government would succeed in obtaining information by conducting
surveillance. Id. at 1150.
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the FISA Court rarely denied authorization of such surveillance.199
Justice Breyer concluded that Respondents’ harm was not
speculative.200
Next, Justice Breyer criticized the way courts have used the
standard of certainty as inconsistent.201 He reasoned that the
certainty standard has never been the “touchstone of standing”
because courts have granted injunctions and declaratory relief “aimed
at preventing future activities that [were] reasonably likely or highly
likely, but not absolutely certain, to take place.”202 Instead of the
“certainly impending” standard for establishing standing in this case,
he argued that the standard should be “reasonably likely or highly
likely.”203 To support his argument that the Court was inconsistent
with its use of the certainty standard, Justice Breyer considered
previous cases in which the Court had used the certainly impending
standard differently.204 In Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, the Court
used the certainly impending standard as a sufficient, rather than a
necessary, condition;205 in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, the Court
used the phrase, “as if it concerned when, not whether, an alleged
injury would occur.”206 The Court in Lujan held that the Plaintiff did
not satisfy imminent injury because “‘soon’ might mean nothing
more than ‘in this lifetime.’”207 However, the Court has referred to
“reasonable probability” in numerous cases suggesting that imminent
is not absolute.208
199

Id. at 1159. Compare with Justice Alito’s majority opinion where he argues
that it is speculative as to whether the FISA Court would authorize surveillance.
Id. at 1150.
200
Id. at 1160.
201
Id. at 1160–61.
202
Id. at 1160.
203
Id.
204
Id.
205
Id. at 1160 (citing Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 593
(1923)).
206
Id. at 1160 (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 555, 564 n.2
(1992)).
207
Id. at 1160 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 564–65 n.2).
208
Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1160. See Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms,
561 U.S. 139 (2010); see also MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118
(2007); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167
(2000); Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat’l Union, 442 U.S. 289 (1979).
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Justice Breyer also discussed five Supreme Court cases in which
the Court found standing when the injury was less than certain.209 In
Pennell v. San Jose, a group of landlords sought a declaration that the
new city ordinance—forbidding landlords to raise the rent charge by
more than eight percent—was unconstitutional.210 The Court held
that the landlords had standing because “the likelihood of
enforcement of the [new ordinance] with the concomitant probability
that a rent will be reduced . . . is a sufficient threat of actual injury to
satisfy Art[icle] III’s requirement.”211 Justice Breyer, however,
pointed out that the facts in Pennell did not amount to absolute
certainty because it was uncertain whether landlords would be
subjected to rent control under the new ordinance.212 In Blum v.
Yaretsky, a group of nursing home residents challenged the regulation
permitting their nursing home to transfer them to a less desirable
home.213 The Court found that they had standing even though
“Medicaid-initiated transfer had been enjoined and the nursing home
itself had not threatened to transfer” them because the injury was not
imaginary or speculative, but “quite realistic.”214 Justice Breyer was
quick to note that the standard was “quite realistic,” far less than
“certainly impending.”215 In Davis v. Federal Election Commission,
the Court held that Davis, a self-financed candidate for the United
States House of Representatives, had standing even though his
opponent did not take advantage of the increased contribution limit
allowed by the challenged statute.216 The Court reasoned that
Davis’s injury was a “realistic and impending threat.”217 In
MedImmune v. Genentech, a patent licensee sought a declaratory
judgment (while he was making payments to the patent holder) that
the patent was invalid.218 The Court held that the patent licensee had
standing because the Court “assumed that if the [patent licensee]
209

Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1161–62.
485 U.S. 1, 4 (1988).
211
Id. at 2.
212
Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1161.
213
457 U.S. 991, 993 (1982).
214
Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1161, (reviewing Blum, 457 U.S. 991).
215
Id.
216
Id. at 1161–62 (reviewing Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724 (2008)).
217
Id.
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549 U.S. 118, 120–21 (2007).
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stopped making royalty payments it would have standing.”219 The
Court applied the “genuine threat” of injury standard in MedImmune
and Justice Breyer noted that the threat of injury in MedImmune was
less certain than in that case.220 Lastly, in Duke Power Co. v.
Carolina Environmental Study Group, a group of residents near a
proposed nuclear power plant challenged the Price-Anderson Act that
limited the plant’s liability in case of an accident.221 The Court held
that the residents had standing because of their “exposure to radiation
and the apprehension flowing from the uncertainty about the health
and genetic consequences of even small emissions.”222 The Court
found standing based on “probabilistic injuries.”223 Concluding that
“certainly impending” means more of a “reasonable probability” or
“high probability” rather than “absolute certainty,” Justice Breyer
held that Respondents demonstrated sufficient future injury to meet
the requirement.224
VI.

IMPACT

This section explores the impact of the heightened standard for
the injury-in-fact requirement on past and future cases and on public
opinion. The majority opinion’s “certainly impending” standard
analysis raised concerns among environmentalists who deal with
environmental issues that are probabilistic in nature and others who
seek to challenge other statutes based on future harm.225 The ruling
in Clapper also brought mixed opinions about government power:
those who believe that national security and civil liberties are still
balanced and those who are concerned with a lack of judicial review.
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Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1162 (reviewing MedImmune, 549 U.S. at 118).
Id.
221
438 U.S. 59, 81 (1978).
222
Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1162 (quoting Duke Power Co., 438 U.S. at 74).
223
Id.
224
Id. at 1165.
225
Patrick Gallagher, Environmental Law, Clapper v. Amnesty International,
USA and the Vagaries of Injury-in-fact: “Certainly Impending” Harm,
“Reasonable Concern,” and “Geographic Nexus”, 32 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. &
POL’Y 1 (2014).
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Legal Impact

The decision in Clapper raised the standard for the “imminent
injury” element. To establish future injury for the purposes of
satisfying Article III standing, the claimant has to show that the
injury is certainly impending.226 Although the Court argued that the
standard has always been “certainly impending” for future injury to
constitute the injury-in-fact element,227 as Justice Breyer pointed out,
the Court used lower standards in previous cases.228 Nonetheless, the
Court in Clapper clearly stated that future injury has to be certainly
impending.229 That clear statement, however, raised concerns for
environmental law.230
Sierra Club’s Legal Director, Patrick
Gallagher, in reviewing the Clapper decision, opined that Clapper
“muddie[d] an already confusing body of law.”231 First, he said the
Court in Clapper “heightened . . . the level of proof required for
standing,” and second, he said the Court “improperly merge[d] the
doctrine of ‘certainly impending’ harm with the doctrine of
‘reasonable concern.’”232 Gallagher was concerned the Clapper
decision would create an additional barrier for environmentalists, so
he set out to clarify Clapper as applied to environmental law.233
Agreeing with Justice Breyer’s dissenting opinion in Clapper,
Gallagher argued that “a ‘certainty’ test [—as used by Justice Alito in
his majority opinion in Clapper—] makes little sense” when the harm
is inherently probabilistic—such as an environmental issue.234
Instead of taking quantitative measures of the risk of harm, courts
should look to qualitative measures, such as Congress’s intent behind
the statute in question and the seriousness of the harm.235 Gallagher
also distinguished “reasonable concern” from “certainly impending
226

Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1147.
Id. Citing Monsanto and Whitmore, Justice Alito claimed that anticipated
future injury must be certainly impending. Id.
228
Id. at 1161.
229
Id. 1147.
230
Gallagher, supra note 225.
231
Id. at 4.
232
Id.
233
Id.
234
Id. at 17.
235
Id. at 17–20.
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harm” by showing that in Laidlaw, the Court viewed the plaintiff’s
reasonable concern for the defendant’s violations of law rather than
imminence of actual harm to the plaintiffs.236 Thus, Respondents in
Clapper did not have standing, not because some harm was not
certainly impending, but because they could not provide sufficient
evidence to trace possible government surveillance to the FISA
Amendments Act.237
The ruling in Clapper seems to strengthen FISA by creating a
higher bar to challenging the Act. Because the whole procedure of
obtaining authorization is so secretive, most people are not aware that
their communication is under the government’s surveillance unless
the information gathered by the government is used against them in a
criminal proceeding.238 If Respondents, who frequently engaged in
international electronic communications with people who were likely
targets under the FISA Amendments Act, could not meet the
certainly impending standard, then who else can satisfy that
standard? Unless the government actually conducted electronic
surveillance under the FISA Amendments Act and the targeted
person became aware of the surveillance (mostly likely in a criminal
case if the government acknowledged their use of electronic
surveillance under the FISA Amendments Act),239 it seems unlikely
that anyone would have standing to challenge the FISA Amendments
Act. Citing Clapper as a precedent, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit ruled that the plaintiffs in Hedges v.
Obama lacked standing.240 A group of journalists and activists
(Plaintiffs) challenged the constitutionality of the National Defense
Authorization Act of 2012 (NDAA), which allowed “the President to
detain anyone who was part of, or has substantially supported, al-

236

Id. at 24.
Id. at 25.
238
Banks, supra note 1, at 1231.
239
Jamid Muhtorov, charged with giving material aid to the Islamic Jihad
Union, became the first criminal defendant to be informed that the government
would be using information obtained under the FISA Amendments Act since its
passage in 2008. Andrea Peterson, Warrantless Wiretapping has Managed to Duck
Significant Judicial Review. Until Now., WASH. POST, (Jan. 30, 2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2014/01/30/warrantlesswiretapping-has-managed-to-duck-significant-judicial-review-until-now/.
240
Hedges v. Obama, 724 F.3d 170, 204–05 (2d Cir. 2013).
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Qaeda, the Taliban, or associated forces” without trial.241 Similar to
Respondents in Clapper, Plaintiffs’ profession required them to
communicate with persons who were likely to be categorized as
hostile to the United States, and thus they feared they might be
detained under the NDAA.242 The Second Circuit held that Plaintiffs
did not have standing due to failure to show “sufficient threat that the
government w[ould] detain them” under the NDAA.243
B.

Social Impact

In his analysis of the Clapper decision, Rush Atkinson, an
attorney at the U.S. Department of Justice, opined that Clapper
“simply allows the government to continue foreign surveillance in
the same fashion it has conducted such surveillance for over seventy
years.”244 The Court’s decision on the standing doctrine did not have
any impact on the government’s power to conduct surveillance under
the FISA Amendments Act.245 He argued that, if anything, the
Clapper decision “incentivizes the government to use warrantless
surveillance sparingly . . . and encourages the use of intelligence
warrants whenever possible.”246
However, encouraging the
government to obtain a warrant for surveillance does not necessarily
mean it is keeping a proper balance between Americans’ civil liberty
and national security. This is because under the FISA Amendments
Act, the government could probably easily obtain warrants for
surveillances that are highly likely to target Americans. There are
provisions under the FISA Amendments Act that are designed to
prohibit the government from violating Americans’ civil liberties.247
But it also has provisions that offset those safeguards.248 Referring to
the time before FISA was enacted, Yoo argued that if Presidents were
241

Id. at 173.
Hedges v. Obama, 890 F.Supp.2d 424, 433 (2012).
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Hedges v. Obama, 724 F.3d at 174.
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Rush Atkinson, The Fourth Amendment’s National Security Exception: Its
History and Limits, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1343, 1403 (2013).
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Id.
246
Id. at 1404.
247
50 U.S.C. §§ 1881a(b), 1881a(g), 1881a(i) (2012).
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See supra Part II.C for discussion regarding how the FISA Amendments
Act offsets additional protections added.
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able to monitor communications concerning national security threats
without a warrant “in peacetime,” then the executive authority has all
the more reason to do the same when the nation is at war with
terrorists.249 Yet, the very reason the nation needed FISA in the first
place was to set a boundary for Presidents’ discretion and to balance
Americans’ civil liberties with national security.
The FISA
Amendments Act seems to have taken a step further away from this
balance.
Some viewed the Clapper ruling as a “‘get out of jail free’ card
for national security statutes that are written . . . with an eye toward
secrecy” and are concerned that the ruling will not only affect
people’s ability to “challenge the constitutionality” of the FISA
Amendments Act, but also other secret government programs.250
Adam Liptak, a Supreme Court correspondent for the New York
Times, also opined that the Clapper ruling “illustrated how hard it is
to mount court challenges to a wide array of antiterrorism measures .
. . in light of the combination of government secrecy and judicial
doctrines limiting access to the court.”251 The FISA Amendments
Act was a four-year statute, scheduled to expire in 2012, but it was
extended until 2017.252
VII.

CONCLUSION

As Neil Richards253 pointed out in his article, “The Dangers of
Surveillance,” people like the benefits of surveillance, yet are fearful
of its costs.254 Most people would probably agree that the
government should have the power to conduct surveillance in order
249

Yoo, supra note 5, at 588.
Matt Sledge, Supreme Court’s Clapper v. Amnesty International Decision
Could Affect Indefinite Detention Lawsuit, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 27, 2013, 8:41
AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/02/27/clapper-v-amnestyinternational_n_2769294.html.
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(Feb.
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http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/27/us/politics/supreme-court-rejects-challengeto-fisa-surveillance-law.html?ref=foreignintelligencesurveillanceactfisa.
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(2013).
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to protect the nation. How much power the government should have
is the question. FISA was originally passed to keep a balance
between “protecting civil liberties and . . . national security.”255
However, Congress has amended FISA numerous times within the
past two decades, arguably tipping the balance in favor of national
security. With all the changes the FISA Amendments Act brought,
one could argue that Congress tried to keep that balance.
Surveillance under the FISA Amendments Act is subject to (1)
statutory conditions,256 (2) judicial authorization,257 (3) congressional
supervision,258 and (4) compliance with the Fourth Amendment.259
But how effective is this safeguard in protecting Americans’ privacy?
When compared with FISA of 1978, the FISA Amendments Act is
more lenient with the government, possibly subjecting Americans to
surveillance. Some argue that changes to FISA were necessary to
equip the government in the war on terror, while others argue that the
changes are unconstitutional. Regardless, Congress has modified
FISA, giving more power to the government. On top of the
government-favored changes to the Act, the decision in Clapper tips
the scale even more towards the government by requiring certainly
impending injury to challenge the FISA Amendments Act.
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